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THE FIRST AMENDMENT VERSUS THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION: EMERGENCY POWERS AND THE
BATTLE IN SEATTLE
Aaron Perrine
Abstract- The 1999 World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial meeting in Seattle was
the target of highly organized, widely supported protest demonstrations. In response to the
protests, city officials declared a state of emergency, ordering nighttime curfews and a
daytime "no-protest zone" in downtown Seattle. They reasoned that the zone was necessary to
protect the rights of WTO delegates and to restore public order. This Comment argues that
mass nonviolent protests deserve more First Amendment protection than was afforded to
demonstrators in Seattle. Even when violence occurs and public order is threatened,
governments must narrowly tailor emergency orders to avoid trampling on peaceful
protesters' First Amendment rights. An analysis of U.S. Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit
case law demonstrates that Seattle's "no-protest zone" was unconstitutional and that courts
should strike down similar restrictions on mass protests.
On November 30, 1999, nearly 40,000' people gathered in downtown
Seattle in a "mass demonstration" 2 to protest the annual ministerial
meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO).' Protesters represent-
ing labor, environmental, and human and animal rights groups
considered the WTO ministerial meeting a unique opportunity to express
their views on the effects of globalization and on the global influence of
transnational corporations.4 Demonstrations forced the delay of the
ministerial meeting's opening ceremony because many delegates could
not reach the Washington State Convention and Trade Center from their
1. The exact number of protesters within the downtown core on November 30 is difficult to
establish. The size of the labor march that arrived downtown in the afternoon was estimated by
police to be 40,000 people. Seattle Police Department After Action Report Nov. 29-Dec. 3 1999, at
http:llwww.ci.seattle.wa.uslspdlSPDMainsitelwto/summaryof__events.htm (last visited May 1,
2001) [hereinafter Police Summary of Events]. Others have estimated the total number of protesters
present throughout the day at 50,000. Heath Foster & Kery Mirakami, Schell and Stamper Can
Expect To Be Severely Criticized, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 4, 1999, at A6. It seems
clear that thousands of protesters were downtown before the marchers arrived. See generally id.
2. For purposes of this Comment, "mass demonstration" or "mass protest" means an event that (I)
involves thousands of protesters in the public fora of city streets who (2) may advocate or participate
in civil disobedience but (3) are, with few (though notable) exceptions, nonviolent.
3. Police Summary of Events, supra note 1.
4. See David Postman & Lynda V. Mapes, Why WTO United So Many Foes, SEATTLE TIMES,
Dec. 6, 1999, at A22.
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hotels.' The vast majority of protesters were peaceful, obeyed the police,
and were not civilly disobedient; however, property damage, violence,
and police provocation occurred. 6 By mid-afternoon, Seattle Mayor Paul
Schell had declared a state of emergency.7 Between 3:30 p.m. on
November 30 and 6:00 a.m. on December 1, Mayor Schell issued three
emergency orders. One of these orders, Emergency Order Number 3
(Order 3) established a limited daytime curfew zone in downtown
Seattle.9 Order 3 did not, on its face, restrict the type of activity allowed
within the zone; however, many have concluded that the zone was
enforced as a "no-protest zone," keeping demonstrators, but not
shoppers, out of downtown for the rest of the conference.)' Although
public order was restored by December 1," city officials did not lift the
"no-protest zone" until after the conference ended on December 3.12
A discussion of the constitutional implications of mass demonstrations
is relevant and timely. Protesters continue to litigate whether their First
5. Stephen H. Dunphy, Numbers Low for Besieged WTO Opening: 3,000 Expected; 200 Seats
Filled, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 30, 1999, at A12.
6. See David Postman, Group Rejects Others' Pleas of 'No Violence': Black-Clad Anarchists
Target Cars, Windows, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 1, 1999, at A 12; see also David Postman & Mike
Carter, Police Switch to New Strategy: They Say Rough Protest Caught Them Off Guard, SEATTLE
TIMES, Dec. 1, 1999, at Al.
7. Jack Broom et al., Protesters Banned, Arrested: Hundreds Hauled Off as Downtown Becomes
a Restricted Zone, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 1, 1999, at A 12.
8. The precise moment when each order was promulgated is unknown and has been the subject of
much debate; however, all three were in effect by the early morning of December 1. Id. Emergency
Order Number I established a nighttime curfew in downtown Seattle. Local Proclamation of Civil
Emergency Order Number 1, at http://www.ci.seattle.wa.us/wto/procs I a.htm (last visited May I,
2001) [hereinafter Order I]. Emergency Order Number 2 prohibited the use, possession, and sale of
gas masks to anyone other than the police or the military (one version also allowed sales to members
of the press with proper credentials). Local Proclamation of Civil Emergency Order Number 2, at
http://www.ci.seattle.wa.us/wto/procs2.htm. (last visited May 1, 2001). This Comment does not
address the constitutionality of these other orders.
9. Local Proclamation of Civil Emergency Order Number 3 (revised), at
http://www.ci.seattle.wa.us/wto/procs3.htm (last visited May 1, 2001) [hereinafter Order 3]. For an
excellent map of the restricted area and protest events, see http://www.cityofseattle.net/
wtocommittee/maps/mapintro.htm. Between the time of its initial promulgation and its expiration
on December 4, Order 3 was revised such that the original "panhandle" encompassing the Westin
Hotel was no longer part of the restricted zone.
10. Timothy Burgess et al., Report to the Seattle City Council WTO Accountability Committee by
the Citizen's Panel on WTO Operations (Sept. 7, 2000) at 31, at http://www.cityofseattle.net/
wtocommittee/panel3_report.pdf (last visited May 1,2001) [hereinafter Operations Panel Report].
I1. See infra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
12. Robert T. Nelson & Brier Dudley, Downtown Reopens Today for Business, SEATTLE TIMES,
Dec. 4, 1999, at Al.
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Amendment rights were denied by the City of Seattle and the Seattle
Police Department. 3 In addition, legal analysis of the Seattle WTO
demonstrations should apply with equal force to similar demonstrations,
such as the International Monetary Fund/World Bank protests in
Washington, D.C., on April 16-17, 2000, the Republican National
Convention protests on August 1-4, 2000, the Democratic National
Convention protests on August 14-17, 2000, and the presidential
inauguration protests on January 20, 200.1 4 Courts need a consistent
analytical framework for, assessing government responses to mass
demonstrations.
This Comment argues that Order 3 was used to regulate and restrict
activities protected by the First Amendment. In the context of mass
demonstrations, the First Amendment should protect peaceful protesters
when their message is unpopular and their audience hostile-even when
other protesters are violent or commit illegal acts. Part I details a
chronology of the WTO meetings to facilitate a discussion of Order 3's
constitutionality. Part II demonstrates how the First Amendment protects
protesters' rights to express their views in public fora. Part I discusses
the evolution of emergency power in the United States and the extent to
which this power legitimately restricts First Amendment rights. Finally,
Part IV argues that measures such as Order 3 violate the First
Amendment and may not be used by local governments to restrict mass
protests.
I. THE SEATTLE WTO MINISTERIAL MEETING AND THE
NONVIOLENT PUBLIC PROTESTS
In spite of adequate notice, the City of Seattle and its police force
were unprepared for the mass demonstrations that took place on
November 30, 1999." In the months leading up to the WTO conference,
Seattle Mayor Paul Schell and other city officials focused their attention
13. Menotti v. City of Seattle, No. COO-372R (W.D. Wash. Mar. 7,2000) (complaint), available
at http:lwww/aclu-wa.orglissueslpolicelwto-second.complaint.3.7.00.html (last visited May 1,
2001); Moore v. City of Seattle, No. COO-1 156R (W.D. Wash. July 11,2000) (complaint).
14. Activists who cut their teeth in Seattle have also gone on to stage highly organized, very large,
peaceful protests around the world. See, e.g., Anthony DePalma, In Quebec's Streets, Fervor, Fears
and a Gamut of Issues, THE NEw YORK TIMES, Apr. 22, 2001 at Al (describing mass
demonstrations at the third Summit of the Americas in Quebec, Canada).
15. Seattle Police Department After Action Report Nov. 29-Dec. 3 1999, at
http://www.ci.seattle.wa.uslspd/SPDMainsite/wto/lessonsleamed.htm (last visited May 1, 2001).
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on promoting the potential benefits of the conference to the Puget Sound
region. 16  As November approached, city officials optimistically
presumed that the city was prepared to handle the protests and the
conference without additional law enforcement assistance. 7 The Direct
Action Network and other protest groups, however, were unambiguous
in their intent to use nonviolent protest to shut down the WTO meeting
by filling the streets and blocking access to the convention center. 18 By
6:00 a.m. on November 30, few Seattle police officers had been
deployed, even as protesters fanned out into preplanned groups to block
key intersections. 9 By 8:30 a.m., Seattle was witnessing its largest ever
mass nonviolent protest.
The vast majority the protestors who filled city streets on November
30 were nonviolent; in fact, many took affirmative steps to prevent
violence and to stop violence where it occurred.20 Media reports,
however, focused attention on the so-called "Black Block" anarchists,
who wore distinctive black clothing and were photographed committing
vandalism on November 30.2 While these violent individuals
represented only a small fraction of the protestors downtown, few if any
were arrested on the 30th.22
As the day progressed, the Seattle Police Department incrementally
lost control of downtown Seattle. 3 While the City had issued myriad
16. Dr. Carl Livingston et al., Report to the Seattle City Council WTO Accountability Review
Committee at 14, at http://www.cityofseattle.net/wtocommittee/p2finalreport.doc (last visited May
1, 2001) [hereinafter Planning Panel Report].
17. Mike Barber, City Rejected Offers of Help Even as Tear Gas Filled Streets, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 4, 1999, at A l.
18. Operations Panel Report, supra note 10, at 13-14; see also Scott Sunde, It's Protest City-and
Get Ready for the Big One Today, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 30, 1999, at A 1.
19. Police Summary of Events, supra note 1.
20. The Seattle City Council and the Seattle Police Department agree that only a small minority of
WTO protestors were violent. Operations Panel Report, supra note 10, at 7; Police Summary of
Events, supra note I. A larger, but still relatively small, number committed nonviolent civil
disobedience. Operations Panel Report, supra note 10, at 4. The majority ofprotestors were engaged
in nonviolent, legal behavior on November 30. Id.
21. See Nicole Brodeur, Vandals Destroy Message of March, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 1, 1999, at
A14.
22. Operations Panel Report, supra note 10, at 19-20.
23. See id. By mid-morning, the police department nearly ran out of tear gas and pepper spray,
and had more flown in from Wyoming. Plainclothes officers were forced to "smuggle" additional
canisters of the chemical weapons through crowds of protesters. J. Martin McOmber et al., Police
Caught Short at WTO: Officers Went to Wyonzing for Tear Gas, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 8, 2000, at
Al, BI.
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demonstration and parade permits,24 the police blamed "unscheduled"
events for disrupting the WTO conference. Many WTO delegates were
stranded at their hotels because the City had not provided secure routes
to and from the convention center.2'6 The City was similarly unprepared
to arrest the tiny minority of violent protestors, whose activities
intensified throughout the day.2 7 By 3:00 p.m., with more than 20,00021
protesters in the streets and a labor-union march about to converge on
downtown, Mayor Schell declared a state of emergency. 9 At Mayor
Schell's request, Governor Gary Locke mobilized the Washington
National Guard °.3 By the early morning3' of December 1, Mayor Schell
had signed Emergency Order 3, which established an "exclusionary
zone," a daytime curfew restricting access to a fifty-block area of the
downtown core.3 Within the zone, Order 3 declared that "no person shall
enter or remain in a public place.' The Order contained exceptions for
WTO delegates and personnel, employees and owners of businesses
within the zone, persons who resided within the zone, properly
credentialed press, city officials, and emergency and public-safety
personnel. 4
Smaller protests continued throughout the week. On December 1,
some additional violence and vandalism occurred, and hundreds of
nonviolent protesters were arrested. 5 December 2 "saw a significant de-
escalation in demonstration activities" and police reported only one,
peaceful demonstration of approximately 1,000 protestors. 6 On
December 3, police reported no significant threats to public order. 7
24. Declaration of Assistant Police Chief Kimerer, ACLU v. City of Seattle, No. C99-1938 (W.D.
Wash. Nov. 30 1999) (including parade permits) [hereinafter Kimerer Declaration].
25. Id.
26. See Postman & Carter, supra note 6.
27. See Police Summary of Events, supra note I.
28. See supra note 1.
29. See Order 1, supra note 8.
30. Broom et al., supra note 7.
31. See supra note 8; cf Kimerer Declaration, supra note 24, at 3-4.
32. See Postman & Carter, supra note 6.
33. Order 3, supra note 9.
34. Id.




Police officers from around the state and National Guard troops
remained deployed downtown throughout the week.38 After the chaotic
events of November 30, police never again lost control of downtown,
and at all times subsequent to the afternoon of December 1 WTO
delegates were able to travel safely to and from their hotels. 39 Although
public order had been restored, Order 3 remained in effect, keeping
protesters far away from WTO delegates for the remainder of the
conference. Order 3 expired at 7:00 a.m. on Saturday, December 4.40
Protestors stated that the opportunity to interact with WTO delegates
was unique, and that the City's actions caused irreparable harm to their
right of free expression.4' On Wednesday, December 1, the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) sought an injunction against Order 3 in
federal court.4' The ACLU cited Collins v. Jordan43 for the proposition
that daytime exclusionary zones violate the First Amendment.' Citing
Madsen v. Women 's Health Center,45 the City argued that establishing a
buffer zone to protect private property and ensure the free flow of traffic
was constitutional.46 District Judge Robert Bryan noted that each case
involved distinguishable factual situations, but declined to grant the
injunction.47 While litigation is ongoing regarding whether the City
infringed on the First Amendment rights of protesters during the WTO
ministerial meeting, no court has subsequently reviewed the
constitutionality of Order 3.
38. Id.
39. See generally id.
40. Id.
41. Daniel Jack Chasan et al., Out of Control, Seattle's Flawed Response to the WTO Protest, at
http://www.aclu-wa.org/ISSUES/police/WTO-Report.html (last visited May 1, 2001). The
ministerial meeting was the first WTO conference to occur in the United States. See
http:/Iwww.wto.orglenglish/thewtoe/minist_e/ministe.htm (last visited May 1, 2001); see also
Operations Panel Report, supra note 10, at 4 (finding ability of anti-WTO groups to protest in visible
and effective manner was "seriously impaired" by limited curfew zone).
42. ACLU v. City of Seattle, No. C99-1938 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 1, 1999);see Duff Wilson, Free-
Speech Rights vs. Protest Ban, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 1, 1999, at A 15.
43. 110 F.3d 1363 (9th Cir. 1996); see infra Part III.B.
44. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, ACLU v.
City of Seattle (W.D. Wash. Dec. 1, 1999) (No. C99-1938), available at www.aclu-
wa.org/issues/police/WTO-Memo.in.Support.of.Motion.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2001).
45. 512 U.S. 753 (1994); see infra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
46. Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, ACLU v.
City of Seattle (W.D. Wash. Dec. 1, 1999) (No. C99-1938).
47. ACLU v. City of Seattle, No. C99-1938 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 1, 1999) (order denying motion for
injunctive relief).
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II. MASS DEMONSTRATIONS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that
"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech.... ."'
It is axiomatic, however, that States are not "powerless to regulate the
conduct of demonstrators and picketers." '49 The U.S. Supreme Court has
articulated rules for the restriction or regulation of First Amendment
activities. First, violent or threatening acts by separate groups cannot be a
basis for arresting peaceful protesters. Second, even if protests are
violent or some protesters break the law, the protest movement itself
cannot be characterized as "violent" for First Amendment purposes
unless violence is "pervasive." Third, the Court closely scrutinizes
restrictions that act as "prior restraints" on speech. Finally, content-
neutral regulations are subject to reduced scrutiny, but must still meet the
constitutional guidelines set forth by the Court. This part will consider
each rule in turn.
A. Peaceful Demonstrators Retain Their First Amendment Rights Even
when Violent Counterdemonstrations Occur
A speaker conveying an unpopular message can engender a hostile
audience response that threatens public order. Conflicting U.S. Supreme
Court precedent exists as to whether police can infringe on peaceful
speakers' First Amendment rights to avoid violence by the speakers'
audience. While an early case allowed this "heckler's veto"'0 to override
a speaker's First Amendment rights, the right to deliver an unpopular
message has been supported in later decisions.
In an early case, the Court held that First Amendment rights gave way
when unpopular speech threatened public order. In Feiner v. New York,"'
Irving Feiner, a black man, used a bullhorn to address a small crowd in
Syracuse, New York. 2 His comments included racially charged,
derogatory remarks toward government officials.53 Feiner's speech
excited white members of the crowd, and at least one crowd member
48. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
49. Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 124 (1969).
50. Eve H. Lewin Wagner, Note, Heckling: A Protected Right or Disorderly Conduct?, 60 S.
CAL. L. REv. 215,219 (1986).
51. 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
52. Id. at 316-17.
53. Id. at 317.
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threatened violence if the police did not order Feiner to stop. 4 Fearing a
fight would break out, a police officer asked Feiner to step down from
his podium, and later arrested him for disobeying that order.5 The Court
found that the order to stop speaking was reasonable and that the
policeman had acted out of a desire to protect public safety, not because
he disagreed with Feiner or wanted to stifle his political message. 6
The Feiner decision has been eclipsed by later case law. For example,
in Gregory v. City of Chicago,7 protesters marched to Chicago Mayor
Richard Daley's home to protest the delay in desegregating the city's
public schools. 8 While the march itself was peaceful and orderly,
hecklers from the neighborhood were insulting and violent, hurling eggs
and rocks and threatening the protesters.5 9 Although nearly 100 police
officers accompanied the eighty-five protesters, the hostile crowd grew
to more than 1200.60 The Chicago police, fearing they could not control
the crowd, ordered Gregory and other marchers to disperse and arrested
them when they refused to do so.61 Gregory was convicted under a
Chicago disorderly conduct statute.62
The Gregory Court held that the marchers were protected by the First
Amendment. 63 The Court noted that "peaceful and orderly" marching fell
within the sphere of protected First Amendment activities and that the
state's charge of disorderly conduct against the protesters was without
evidentiary support.6' Finding the conviction lacked evidentiary support
implied that the threatening and violent behavior of counter-
demonstrators did not make the march itself "disorderly" for First
Amendment purposes.65 While Gregory did not explicitly overrule
54. See id.
55. Id. at 317-18.
56. Id. at 320-21.
57. 394 U.S. 111 (1969).
58. Id. at 115 (Black, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 126-30 (Black, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 128-30 (Black, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 116-17 (Black, J., concurring).
62. Id. at 112.
63. Id. at 112-13.
64. Id. at 112.
65. See, e.g., Sabel v. Stynchcombe, 746 F.2d 728, 730-31 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (holding that arrest
for failure to obey police was order unconstitutional because hostile audience, rather than
demonstrators, was source of public disorder).
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Feiner,66 the rule in Gregory is that the acts of groups separate from
peaceful protesters do not diminish the latter's First Amendment rights.67
B. Peaceful Demonstrators Retain Their First Amendment Rights Even
when Isolated Incidences ofProtester Violence Occur
Although violent protest is not protected by the First Amendment,
nonviolent protesters retain their First Amendment rights even if violent
acts occur simultaneously with peaceful protests. In NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co.,68 the U.S. Supreme Court held that a seven-year NAACP
boycott against businesses in Claiborne County, Mississippi, was
protected by the First Amendment even though acts of violence were
carried out by boycott participants. In Claiborne, merchants brought suit
against the NAACP, the chief organizer of the boycott.69 The Mississippi
Supreme Court held the NAACP liable under Mississippi tort law, and
awarded damages based on the economic loss merchants suffered during
the boycott.70 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed.7'
The boycott at issue in Claiborne was not entirely peaceful. Some
activists threatened black citizens of Claiborne County with violence if
they patronized white-owned businesses.72 In two cases, shots were fired
at homes of blacks who disregarded the boycott.73 In at least one case
property damage occurred.74 Additionally, a group of protesters known as
"Black Hats" stood outside boycotted businesses, recording names of
those who entered and generally intimidating Claiborne citizens.75 At one
point during the boycott, tension was so high that local police requested
reinforcements from the Mississippi Highway Patrol76 and the mayor
established a nighttime curfew.77 Still, the Court noted that the "practices
66. The Gregory Court distinguished Feiner by noting that the Chicago ordinance did not define
"disorderly conduct" as the failure to obey a police order. Gregory, 394 U.S. at 112 n*.
67. See generally Wagner, supra note 50, at 219-22 (comparing Gregory with Feiner).
68. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
69. Id. at 889.
70. Id. at 894-95.
71. Id. at 934.
72 Id. at 903-04.
73. Id. at 904.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 903.
76. Id. at 902.
77. Id.
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generally used [by the protesters] to encourage support for the boycott
were uniformly peaceful and orderly," and refused to hold the organizers
liable for economic damages.78 The Court found no justification for
abridging the First Amendment rights of boycotters where the majority
of the conduct stemming from the boycott was peaceful:
The taint of violence colored the conduct of some of the petitioners.
They, of course, may be held liable for the consequences of their
violent deeds. The burden of demonstrating that it colored the
entire collective effort, however, is not satisfied by evidence that
violence occurred or even that violence contributed to the success
of the boycott. A massive and prolonged effort to change the social,
political, and economic structure of a local environment cannot be
characterized as a violent conspiracy simply by reference to the
ephemeral consequences of relatively few violent acts. 79
Claiborne elucidates a different facet of First Amendment law than
Gregory. In Gregory, the Court held that violence by outside hecklers-
counterprotesters not sharing the same purpose as those arrested-did
not excuse the government's transgression of First Amendment rights.8"
In Claiborne, the Court carved out a larger space of First Amendment
protection, suggesting that unless violence is "pervasive,"'" the rights of
nonviolent protesters must be protected.
C. Courts Strictly Scrutinize Prior Restraints on First Amendment
Rights
Courts strictly scrutinize prior restraints82 on expression. The U.S.
Supreme Court has held that "prior restraints [on] expression [come] to
this Court bearing a heavy presumption against.., constitutional
validity."83 The early cases developing the use of prior restraints
generally involved statutes or ordinances creating standardless licensing
78. Id. at 903 (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 933.
80. See supra notes 57-67 and accompanying text.
81. See Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 923.
82. Prior restraints are those which "restrain a particular expression prior to its dissemination."
Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment Theory, 70
VA. L. REV. 53,53 (1984).
83. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963); see also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697, 716 (1931) (holding that prior restraints on publication are presumed unconstitutional).
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schemes.84 Modem cases, discussed here, focus on whether speech is
being targeted because of its content and whether the expression of a
given message is foreclosed entirely by the restriction at bar. These cases
focus on injunctions granted by lower courts to prohibit expressive
activity.
Injunctions against First Amendment activities may operate as prior
restraints when their purpose is to restrict the content of a particular
message and when expression of that content is foreclosed ahead of
time." For example, in New York Times Co. v. United States,86 the
federal government attempted to obtain an injunction barring the New
York Times newspaper from publishing the "Pentagon Papers," a
classified report on government policy during the Vietnam War.87 The
Court held that the government had not met the "heavy burden" of
justifying a prior restraint on speech, and declined to grant an injunction
against publication of the report.88
Not all restrictions that restrain speech prior to its occurrence
constitute prior restraints. In Madsen v. Women's Health Center,89 for
example, a Florida state judge issued an injunction establishing a thirty-
six-foot buffer zone around an abortion clinic.90 Within the zone, anti-
abortion protest was not allowed.9' The Court refused to analyze the
injunction as a prior restraint and instead found it to be a "content-
84. Statutes or ordinances requiring licenses to exercise First Amendment rights, for example, to
distribute leaflets or parade on city streets, must provide standards for the issuance of the licenses
that are not vague or overbroad. See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51
(1969) (addressing ordinances that require permits for parades); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S.
444, 451 (1938) (addressing ordinances that require permits for leafleting).
85. See, e.g., Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 308 (1980); N.Y. Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 713-14 (1971). Injunctive relief often comes in the form of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), immediately forcing one party to take or not take action
contrary to the court's ruling. In the Ninth Circuit, a motion for a TRO requires that the moving
party show: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, or (2)
the existence of serious questions going to the merits and the balance of hardships tipping in its
favor. FED. R. Ctv. P. 65(b); Jacobsen v. U.S. Postal Serv., 812 F.2d 1151, 1152 (9th Cir. 1987).
86. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
87. Id. at 714; see also Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 764 (1994).
88. 403 U.S. at 714. Under the collateral-bar rule, the underlying unconstitutionality of an
injunction is not a defense to its violation, unless it is unconstitutional in all aspects. As a result,
injunctions against expressive activity warrant particular judicial scrutiny. See generally Stephen R.
Barnett, The Puzzle ofPrior Restraint, 29 STAN. L. REV. 539,551-52 (1977).
89. 512U.S. 753 (1994).
90. Id. at 759.
91. Id.
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neutral 92 order that left open alternative methods of expression.93
Because protesters could still protest from the other side of the street,
across from the clinic, the ban was only an "incidental" restriction on
free expression and was therefore permissible.94
Although the injunction in Madsen was held not to be a prior restraint,
the Court noted that the First Amendment prohibited restricting any more
speech than was necessary to serve the government's interest.9" While the
Court held that the thirty-six-foot buffer zone was justified and still left
adequate additional avenues for expression, it struck down other portions
of the injunction.96 The Madsen Court held unconstitutional the
restricting on the use of "images observable" to patients within the clinic,
and restricting protesters from approaching patients for the purpose of
providing counseling within 300 feet of the clinic.97 This portion of the
Madsen holding suggests that courts must analyze the specific
parameters of restrictions to determine whether they are justified vis-a-
vis the government's interest.
D. Judicial Review of Content-Neutral Restrictions
Content-neutral restrictions on expressive activity are those that do not
depend on the content or communicative impact of the activity, facially
or as applied.98 Compared to prior restraints, content-neutral restrictions
enjoy a substantially reduced level of judicial scrutiny. Not all content-
neutral restrictions, however, survive even this level of scrutiny.
To determine whether a restriction on public expression is content
neutral, courts examine whether the government "has adopted a
regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it
conveys." 99 As long as the government articulates a legitimate interest
"unrelated to the suppression of free expression," the actual effect of the
restriction is inapposite.' Even where a restriction has an "incidental
92. See supra Part 1l.D.
93. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 764 n.2.
94. Id. at 763.
95. Id. at 765.
96. Id. at 772-73.
97. Id.
98. See generally LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2 (1978).
99. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); see also Clark v. Cmty. for Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295 (1984).
100. United States v. O'Brien 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
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effect" on some viewpoints but not others, the restriction is deemed
content neutral if it is "justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech."''
Content-neutral restrictions may regulate expression, but may not ban
protected classes of speech entirely.2 The Court has held that a
prohibition on an entire class of speech, even though free of content or
viewpoint discrimination, poses too great a danger to First Amendment
rights by "eliminating a common means of speaking."'0 3 For example, in
Schneider v. State,"° the Court struck down an ordinance prohibiting
leafleting on public streets." 5 Even though the ordinance was content
neutral, the Court found that the state's interest in preventing littering
was insufficient to justify a ban on leafleting as an entire class of
speech.
10 6
Content-neutral restrictions fall into two general categories. When the
government is attempting to regulate the underlying conduct associated
with expressive activity, and a restriction on First Amendment rights is
incidental to the conduct-based regulation, the restriction is subject to the
test in United States v. O'Brien."7 Second, when the government applies
content-neutral restrictions to expressive activity in the public forum, it
may regulate only the time, place, or manner of the activities, under the
rule in Ward v. Rock Against Racism.08 The U.S. Supreme Court has
applied these time, place, and manner rules to restrictions designed to
protect the entry to and exit from specific locations in the context of
abortion-clinic cases.
101. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791-92 (quoting Clark, 468 U.S. at 293); see also Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981).
102. See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939).
103. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 55 (1994).
104. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
105. Id. at 162.
106. Id. The First Amendment permits governments to require a permit for expressive activities
where the permitting scheme is content neutral and serves a legitimate government interest. See, e.g.,
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574-76 (1941) (upholding statute requiring parade permits
because it served legitimate government interest in maintaining public safety, traffic flow, and
adequate policing during parades). But see Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938)
(overturning city ordinance requiring permit to distribute leaflets on grounds that permitting scheme
amounted to censorship).
107. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
108. 491 U.S. 781 (1989). But see Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence 468 U.S. 288,297-
98 (1984) (holding that if government interest is unrelated to expression, then time, place, and
manner restrictions do not apply).
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1. Content-Neutral Restrictions on Expressive Conduct and the
O'Brien Test
United States v. O'Brien sets forth the test for evaluating content-
neutral restrictions on expressive activities. In O'Brien, the defendant
was arrested for burning his draft card in violation of a federal statute.' 9
The defendant argued that burning the card was expressive activity pro-
tected by the First Amendment. 0 The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed"'
and articulated a test for determining the constitutionality of content-
neutral restrictions on expression:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important
or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than
is essential to the furtherance of that interest." 2
In applying this test, the O'Brien Court upheld the statute that banned
the burning of draft cards. First, the Court found that the statute was part
of a registration system for military conscription, valid pursuant to
Congress's power to raise and support armies.' Second, the Court found
that the statute furthered the "substantial" government interest in
efficient operation of the draft.' Third, the Court found that only the
noncommunicative impact of the defendant's conduct was prohibited by
the statute, and that the statute did not discriminate based on the content
of speech that accompanied the illegal conduct of burning a draft card."'
Fourth, the Court found that the statute was narrowly tailored because it
prohibited only conduct that clearly frustrated the government's interest
in a smooth-running conscription system."6
109. 391 U.S. at 370-71.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 371-72.
112. Id. at 377.
113. Id. at 377-78.
114. Id. at 381-82; see also Clark v. Cmty. forCreative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,296 (1984).
For a discussion of what constitutes a substantial government interest, see Kevin Francis O'Neill,
Disentangling the Law of Public Protest, 45 LOY. L. REv. 411,438 (1999).
115. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 379-80.
116. Id. at 381-82.
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2. Content-Neutral Restrictions in Public Fora and the Ward Test
When restricting expressive activity in public fora, the government
may regulate only the time, place, or manner of the activity. The test for
time, place, or manner restrictions is very similar to the O'Brien test for
expressive conduct. In Ward v. Rock Against Racism,'" the Court found
constitutional an ordinance requiring concert organizers in Central Park
to use sound equipment provided by the city rather than private equip-
Ment." 8 The government's stated purpose was to shield the public from
excessive noise by controlling the volume of concerts in the park. 9
Because the government's interest was unrelated to the content of the
music played, the Court held that the ordinance was content neutral.
20
The Ward Court also noted that time, place, and manner restrictions
must be narrowly tailored and leave open alternative channels for
communication. 12' However, the Court stressed that the government's
need not employ the least restrictive method of serving the government's
interest. Instead, "the requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied 'so long
as the ... regulation promotes a substantial government interest that
would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation."1 22 The Court
held that the ordinance met the "alternative channels" test because users
of the Central Park band shell could still adequately express their
message with reduced volume."u
In the Ninth Circuit, the government bears the burden of showing that
time, place, and manner restrictions are narrowly tailored and provide
adequate alternative methods for communication. 24 In Bay Area Peace
Navy v. United States,12S a seventy-five-yard "safety exclusion zone' in
front of the VIP pier during a Fleet Week boat parade was held
unconstitutional. 26 The Bay Area Peace Navy, a local activist group,
117. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
118. Id. at 802.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 792.
121. Id. at 791 (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
122. Id. at 798-99 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
123. Id. at 802.
124. Bay Area Peace Navy v. United States, 914 F.2d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that
government bears the burden of proving that restriction is narrowly tailored and leaves open
alternative methods for communication).
125. 914 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir. 1990).
126. Id. at 1231.
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wished to demonstrate against the celebration of U.S. naval power by
conducting its own boat parade in front of the pier. 127 Because the
group's expressive activity included singing and other oral
communication, its parade would have been ineffective from seventy-
five yards away. 128 The Ninth Circuit noted that the government "is not
free to foreclose expressive activity in public areas on mere speculation
about danger,"'129 and held that the government had failed to show that a
seventy-five-yard exclusion zone was not "substantially broader than
necessary."'3 °
While within the scope of Ward and O'Brien, the Ninth Circuit's
holding in Bay Area Peace Navy explicitly places the burden of proof on
the government to justify restraints on expression. 3' The government
must prove both that the restriction at bar is not "substantially broader
than necessary" and that ample alternatives are available for the
expression being restricted.'32
3. Time, Place, or Manner Restrictions Protecting Entry and Exit at
Specific Locations
The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed restrictions designed to protect
entry and exit at particular locations in cases involving abortion clinics.
Following Madsen,33 the Court in Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of
Western New York 134 held that a "floating buffer zone" of fifteen feet
127. Id. at 1225.
128. Id. at 1226, 1229.
129. Id. at 1228. Subsequent to the bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen, it seems reasonable to
question whether courts would still reject a security provision of this type. See Jan M. Olsen, 39 U.S.
Sailors in German Hospital, The Associated Press, Oct. 14, 2000, available at 2000 WL 27906507.
Order 3's promulgation, however, was unrelated to terrorism in the sense of the USS Cole bombing;
although many other security precautions surrounding the WTO conference did address terrorism,
they are not the subject of this Comment.
130. Id. at 1227 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 (1989)).
131. Id. ("The govemment bears the burden of proving that the narrowly tailored and alternative
communication prongs are satisfied.") (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing City of Watseka v.
Ill. Pub. Action Council, 796 F.2d 1547, 1551 (7th Cir. 1986), affd without opinion, 479 U.S. 1048
(1987)); cf Clark v. Cmty. For Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 n. 5 (1984) ("[lI]t is
common to place the burden upon the Government to justify impingements on First Amendment
interests.").
132. Id. at 1228, 1230.
133. See supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
134. 519 U.S. 357 (1997).
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violated the First Amendment.135 The injunction in Schenck required that
protesters move out of the way to stay fifteen feet from individuals
entering a clinic. 36 The Court also reaffirmed the Madsen rule, holding
that while protecting entry into and exit from a clinic serves a substantial
government interest, an injunction restricting First Amendment rights
must be narrowly tailored to restrict "no more speech than necessary."' 37
In Hill v. Colorado,' the Court upheld a Colorado statute making it a
misdemeanor to "knowingly approach" within eight feet of a person
entering or leaving a health care facility "for the purpose of passing a
leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest,
education, or counseling with such other person.' 39 The Colorado
Legislature found a significant state interest in "preventing the willful
obstruction of a person's access to medical counseling and treatment at a
health care facility."'" The Court noted that this interest was unrelated to
the suppression of speech.' In addition, the Court found that the
restriction was narrowly tailored, because it provided only an eight-foot
buffer zone and did not require a stationary protester to move out of the
way if a clinic patron approached within eight feet. 142 Finally, the statute
left open adequate alternative methods for expression by allowing any
protest, education, or counseling that did not entail moving within eight
feet of a clinic patron. 43
The U.S. Supreme Court has constructed a solid foundation of
constitutional rules underlying the First Amendment. First, restrictions
on expressive activity cannot be justified through reference to the
violence of counter-demonstrators. Second, even when certain protesters
are violent, the government bears the burden of showing that the violence
colored the entire protest movement before restrictions may be imposed.
Third, prior restraints on speech are presumed unconstitutional, and must
survive strict scrutiny by the courts. Fourth, restrictions that are facially
content neutral are subject to less scrutiny, and are analyzed under the
135. Id. at 367.
136. Id. at 364.
137. Id. at 371 (citing Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994)).
138. 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000).
139. Id. at 2484 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122 (1999)).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 2491.
142. Id. at 2494.
143. Id.
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tests formulated in O'Brien and Ward and explicated in the Ninth Circuit
by Bay Area Peace Navy. The Court has specifically addressed
restrictions designed to protect entry and exit at specific locations, and
requires that they affect no more speech than necessary.
III. EMERGENCY POWERS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Emergency powers allow the government to suspend constitutional
rights temporarily.' 44 In the American constitutional system, "[a]
fundamental tension exists.., between the basic premise of government
constrained by law and the perceived need for unfettered, discretionary
power to confront dire emergencies."'145 In the context of the executive
orders promulgated during the WTO protest, two features of modem
emergency power 46 are of interest. First, the dichotomy between
"normal" and "emergency" situations blurred during the twentieth
century. The blurring has occurred at the federal level, but has also been
exploited by state and local governments. Second, economic issues have
risen to the level of an "emergency." In reviewing modem emergency
orders, many courts have applied a low level of judicial scrutiny. The
Ninth Circuit, however, splits from other circuits and closely scrutinizes
emergency orders promulgated in the context of mass demonstrations.
A. The Expansion of Emergency Powers
Changes in the world's political and military structure beginning in
the 20th century have fostered the gradual erosion of any meaningful
dichotomy between "normal" and "emergency" power. 47 Increasing
globalization and advancing military technology have greatly expanded
the number and kinds of threats to which emergency response is
necessary and perhaps reasonable. 48 As the pace of global politics has
144. See, e.g., United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277, 1280 (4th Cir. 1971).
145. Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385, 1386
(1989).
146. For an explanation of the origins and early development of emergency powers, see id., at
1386-97, and Oren Gross, The Normless and Exceptionless Exception: Carl Schmitt's Theory of
Emergency Powers and the "Norm-Exception" Dichotomy, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1825, 1826-27
(2000).
147. See Lobel, supra note 145, at 1398; cf Gross, supra note 146, at 1847-48.
148. See Lobel, supra note 145, at 1399-412.
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increased, the political expediency of emergency powers has become
more attractive to national executives.
1 49
As America rose to become a world military and economic leader, the
President was granted increasingly broad authority by emergency
legislation in Congress. 5 ' With a few notable exceptions, the U.S.
Supreme Court has acquiesced to the President's exercise of emergency
powers.' After Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the
Court upheld the constitutionality of military orders relocating and
detaining U.S. citizens of Japanese ancestry."' Following World War
Two, the "emergency" of the Korean War became the constant
emergency of the Cold War. 53 "Emergencies" in the last three decades of
the 20th century included such national crises as the introduction of
armed forces in Indo-China, Iran, Lebanon, Central America, Grenada,
Libya, and the Persian Gulf.'" Congressional attempts to reform the
emergency powers of the executive branch have been ineffective.'55
This blurring of the normal-emergency dichotomy at the federal level
has made expanded emergency powers at the state and local levels more
constitutionally palatable. State and local emergency statutes are
generally written to allow the governor or mayor to respond to natural
disasters or severe public disturbances.'56 When the designated
government official declares a state of emergency, these statutes allow,
for example, the imposition of a curfew, the ban on sales of alcohol and
weapons, and forced relocations to emergency shelters.'57 Emergency
statutes usually require that the state of emergency expire either within a
certain time period absent further proclamation or as soon as the
149. Id.; see also Gross, supra note 146, at 1858.
150. See Lobel, supra note 145, at 1400.
151. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 689 (1981) (upholding executive
emergency power). But see Youngstown Steel & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,588-89 (1952).
152. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,217-18 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320
U.S. 81, 95 (1943).
153. See generally Lobel, supra note 145, at 1399-412.
154. See id. at 1414.
155. See id at 1413-15 (describing National Emergencies Act).
156. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 38.52.020 (2000); SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE
§ 10.02.010 (1999); see also CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8625 (West 2001); KANSAS CITY, MO., MuNICI-
PAL CODE § 50-155 (1998); NEW YORK Crry, N.Y., CODE § 3-104 (2000).
157. See supra note 156.
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emergency ceases to exist.15 8 As discussed below, courts differ as to the
stringency with which they review state and local emergency powers.'59
Emergency power in the United States has also evolved along with
capitalist liberal democracy. 160 As developed economies have grown
more and more dependent on trade and capital flows, economic threats to
the state have become more serious, rising even to the level of a military
attack. 16' By the 1930s, "the notion of the emergency situation was
increasingly separated from any evidence of military conflict or armed
rebellion whatsoever." 62 The powers granted to President Roosevelt
during the Great Depression stand as "the largest single instance of
delegated power in American history."'63
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed economic emergency in an early
case in Home Building & Loan Ass 'n v. Blaisdell."' The Blaisdell Court
upheld Minnesota's mortgage moratorium law. 165 Enacted in response to
the Great Depression, the law froze mortgage foreclosures in an alleged
violation of the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution.'66 While
finding that "[e]mergency does not increase granted power or remove or
diminish the restrictions imposed upon power granted or reserved,"'167 the
Court's five-to-four decision upheld the Minnesota law. 168 In a decision
paradigmatic of the changing face of emergency power, Chief Justice
Hughes's opinion noted that "[the] principle of harmonizing the
constitutional prohibition with the necessary residuum of state power has
had progressive recognition in the decisions of this Court."'169 Blaisdell
158. See supra note 156.
159. See infra Part III.B.
160. William E. Scheuerman, The Economic State of Emergency, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1869,
1875 (2000). Scheuerman suggests that the development of emergency powers has followed a four
step process: (1) to impose martial law to counter labor strikes; (2) to directly manage the underlying
economic crisis itself; (3) to prevent occurrence of economic emergency in the first instance; and (4)
to provide a permanent measure of economic management. Id.
161. See id. at 1878-79; see also Gross, supra note 146, at 1863 (noting that free trade has
become national-security concern).
162. See Scheuerman, supra note 160, at 1878.
163. CLINTON L. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN THE
MODERN DEMOCRACIES 260 (Greenwood Press, Inc. 1979) (1948).
164. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
165. Id. at 447.
166. Id. at 415.
167. Id. at 425-16.
168. Id. at 447-48.
169. Id. at 435.
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underscored the increasing acceptance of the use of executive powers to
confront economic problems.
B. Courts Apply Divergent Standards in Reviewing Local Emergency
Orders
In reviewing emergency orders, courts have imposed various levels of
judicial scrutiny. For example, the Fourth Circuit refrains from second-
guessing emergency orders, applying only minimal due process
scrutiny. 7 ' In United States v. Chalk7' the Mayor of Asheville, North
Carolina, imposed a nighttime curfew following race riots at Asheville
High School. 72 The plaintiffs, convicted of possessing a weapon and
driving a vehicle in violation of the curfew, argued that the statute was
vague and overbroad, and that the supposed threat to public safety was
insufficient to justify the restrictions imposed by the mayor. 73 While
rhetorically suggesting that the use of emergency powers to curtail
expressive activity is subject to judicial review, the Fourth Circuit
refused to scrutinize the mayor's order. 74 Finding that it would be
"highly inappropriate for us... to substitute our judgment for his," the
court limited its scope of review to determining whether the mayor acted
in good faith and had some factual basis for his decision. 75 Thus, the
Fourth Circuit failed to apply even intermediate scrutiny to the order,
opting instead for a kind of minimal due process scrutiny. 76
Other courts have cited Chalk in reviewing emergency orders
promulgated in the wake of natural disasters and riots.'77 While
concluding that emergency orders must not be vague or overbroad, nor
encourage arbitrary enforcement, the courts have upheld the laws and
orders in question. 78 The rule in Washington is functionally equiv-
170. The U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed this issue.
171. 441 F.2d 1277 (4th Cir. 1971).
172. Id. at 1278.
173. Id. at 1280.
174. Id. at 1280-81.
175. Id. at 1281.
176. See generally TRIBE, supra note 98.
177. See Smith v. Avino, 91 F.3d 105, 109 (11th Cir. 1996); In re Juan C., 28 Cal. App. 4th 1093,
1101 (1994); see also Morgan v. Rhodes, 456 F.2d 608, 611 (6th Cir. 1972); Moorhead v. Farrelly,
727 F. Supp. 193,200-01 (D.V.1. 1989).
178. See, e.g., Avino, 91 F.3d at 110; Juan C., 28 Cal. App. 4th at 1103.
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alent. '79 When communities are threatened by natural disasters, courts are
understandably hesitant to second-guess the good-faith efforts of local
officials. 8 '
In the context of public disturbances, however, the Ninth Circuit does
not follow the "minimal due process scrutiny" rule in Chalk. In Collins v.
Jordan,8' the Ninth Circuit refused to grant immunity to San Francisco
officials who imposed a city-wide no-protest ban after violent demon-
strations following the Rodney King verdict. 82 The Collins court
distinguished between a nighttime curfew and a daytime ban on
expressive activities, finding that they were "entirely different matter[s]"
and holding that no reasonable police officer would believe that the
daytime restriction was legal.
83
In addition, Collins established that emergency orders must be tailored
to address current crises, and cannot be used to preempt the future
exercise of First Amendment rights.'84 The Collins court held as a matter
of law that "the occurrence of limited violence and disorder on one day is
not a justification for banning all demonstrations, peaceful and
otherwise, on the immediately following day (or for an indefinite period
thereafter)."' 185 The Collins court also suggested that emergency orders
should not be used as prior restraints on First Amendment activities,
noting that when unlawful conduct and First Amendment activities are
intertwined, the illegal activities should be punished after their
occurrence so as to avoid infringing on constitutional rights.'86
Collins puts the Ninth Circuit at odds with the Fourth Circuit in Chalk,
which examined only whether executive action was taken "in good
faith."' 87 Collins shows that it is reasonable to apply a different standard
of review to emergency orders where the "emergency" is not a hurricane
or a volcano, but the mass exercise of First Amendment rights. In other
179. Cougar Bus. Owners Ass'n v. Washington, 97 Wash. 2d 466, 478 (1982) (reviewing
emergency orders promulgated subsequent to eruption of Mt. St. Helens).
180. See, e.g., Avino, 91 F.3d at 108, 110 (declining to hold that Florida curfew was overbroad,
even though it was in effect for twelve weeks after Hurricane Andrew made landfall in Florida).
181. 110 F.3d 1363 (9th Cir. 1996).
182. id. at 1366, 1378.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1372-73.
185. Id. at 1372.
186. Id. at 1372-73.
187. United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277, 1281 (4th Cir. 1971).
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words, Collins directs courts to scrutinize emergency orders that operate
like restraints on the exercise of First Amendment rights.
IV. ORDER 3: AN EXAMPLE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL
RESTRICTIONS ON MASS DEMONSTRATIONS
Restrictions on mass protests-even those promulgated during a
declared state of emergency-must meet certain criteria to withstand a
First Amendment challenge, especially in the Ninth Circuit. When
executives point to clogged streets and broken windows to justify closing
the public forum to protestors, courts must determine whether First
Amendment rights are being unduly trampled. Order 3, promulgated by
Mayor Schell in response to the Seattle WTO protests, exemplifies a
restriction that should not survive such scrutiny. An analysis of Order 3
provides a template for how courts should address executive emergency
powers stemming from mass demonstrations. First, Order 3 contravenes
the holding of Gregory, where the Court concluded that police may not
abdicate their responsibility to ensure a peaceful forum for political
expression through reference to potential or actual violence by third
parties. Second, Order 3 fails the rule in Claiborne, because violence on
the part of some protesters does not reduce the First Amendment
protection of other, peaceful protesters. Third, Order 3 operated as a prior
restraint on expression and fails the strict scrutiny test. Fourth, Order 3 is
not a valid content-neutral restriction. Finally, as an emergency power,
daytime protest bans fall squarely within the holding of Collins and are
thus unconstitutional.
A. By Infringing on the First Amendment Rights ofPeaceful
Protesters, Order 3 Fails the Gregory Guidelines
In evaluating emergency orders that restrict First Amendment rights,
courts must first consider Gregory v. City of Chicago. Gregory held that
(1) to the extent violent acts are carried about by groups separate from a
peaceful protest movement, such acts do not lessen the First Amendment
rights of peaceful protesters and (2) the rights of peaceful protesters may
not be infringed on when police are unprepared for and unable to cope
with violence marginal to the protest itself "'
188. Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 111-12 (1969).
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Although the facts of Gregory are distinguishable, Order 3
nonetheless fails the Gregory guidelines. In Gregory, peaceful protesters
were ringed by a hostile audience of counter-demonstrators. 89 The WTO
protests in Seattle were larger than those in Gregory, and it was other
anti-WTO protesters, not a hostile audience, that threatened public
order. 9 Gregory, however, still applies for two reasons. First, violent
protesters can reasonably be treated as counterdemonstrators, similar to
those in Gregory, because the vast majority of demonstrators held
nonviolence as a fundamental tenet of their expressive purpose. 9'
Second, Gregory held that the violent action of other groups provided
"no evidence" that the peaceful protesters had been disorderly.' 92 The
notion that peaceful protest does not become disorderly conduct through
the actions of others applies with equal force to the Seattle
demonstrations.
Even to the extent that public disorder was threatened by counter-
demonstrators, Gregory maintained that the government cannot respond
by closing the public forum to peaceful protesters. 93 Seattle officials
were not prepared for the demonstration that confronted them on
November 30.94 The violence and property destruction that did occur,
however, was not completely unexpected-the police were well
informed of the activities of the Black Block and other potentially violent
groups. 9' Under Gregory, the Seattle Police Department had at least
some responsibility to direct its attention to the sources of violence and
vandalism before closing off the public forum to peaceful protesters.
Order 3 allowed the police to "punt"--authorizing the use of force to
clear streets and arrest any protesters downtown. Order 3 contravenes
Gregory and is an unconstitutional infringement of First Amendment
rights.
Admittedly, Feiner v. New York,196 which has not been explicitly
overruled, is inconsistent with Gregory. Feiner holds that when an
189. Id.
190. See id.; Police Summary of Events, supra note 1.
191. See Postman & Carter, supra note 6.
192. Gregory, 394 U.S. at 112.
193. Id.
194. See Postman & Carter, supra note 6.
195. See supra Part 1; cf Operations Panel Report, supra note 10, at 23 (noting that police "failed
to take adequate measures to prevent and deter... criminal activity").
196. 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
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unpopular protest message engenders a hostile response, police may
restrict protesters' speech to maintain public order.'97 Applying Feiner to
modem protests, however, leads to an absurd result by allowing a
"heckler's veto"--a situation where police may halt any demonstration
when hecklers appear. Under Feiner, speakers disobeying police orders
to stop speaking may be arrested and convicted, as long as police action
is in response to the crowd reaction and not from a desire to suppress the
speakers' viewpoint.' The U.S. Supreme Court is unlikely to support
such an absurd application of its precedent.'99
Gregory provides the correct, modem standard and holds that police
may not abdicate their responsibility to protect the peaceful exercise of
First Amendment rights through their own unpreparedness. 20 Unlike
Feiner, Gregory looks at whether the protest activity itself is protected
by the First Amendment.2"' Under Gregory, Order 3 was invalid because
it took away the rights of protesters who were peacefully exercising their
First Amendment rights.
B. By Infringing on the First Amendment Rights of Substantially
Peaceful Protest Groups, Order 3 Fails the Claiborne Test
Next, courts reviewing emergency orders must consider NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co.2 2 The Claiborne Court stated unambiguously
that perpetrators of violent or illegal acts were not shielded by the First
Amendment. 3 Claiborne, however, also held that even when elements
of the same protest commit violent acts, those acts do not characterize
the entire protest for First Amendment purposes. The Claiborne decision
set a high standard for deciding when the "entire collective effort" of a
protest has been tainted by violence.2' Under Claiborne, violent action is
treated as distinct from the underlying political cause, unless the violence
197. Id. at 320--21; see supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
198. Feiner, 340 U.S. at 320.
199. See Wagner, supra note 50, at 219-22.
200. See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
201. Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 112 (1969).
202. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).




is so pervasive as to characterize the cause itself as a "violent con-
spiracy.20 5
Order 3 violated Claiborne by banning demonstrations downtown for
three days after the mass demonstrations on November 30. Local
officials may have been justified in taking action on November 30 in
direct response to violent demonstrators. 2' The violence of November
30, however, did not legitimize the foreclosure of all First Amendment
rights in the downtown core for the remainder of the WTO conference.
Just as the owners of businesses targeted by the Claiborne boycott could
not restrict peaceful activists from standing outside their stores through
reference to other, violent activists," 7 the district court should not have
permitted Mayor Schell to foreclose the right of peaceful protesters to
demonstrate for the remainder of the conference.
Although the boycott at issue in Claiborne remains factually distinct
from the WTO mass protests, the holding should still apply. The thrust of
Claiborne is to protect protest movements from being characterized as
violent through reference to "relatively few violent acts."0 8 In that sense,
the Claiborne rule should apply to mass demonstrations like those
occurring during the WTO ministerial in Seattle, where violence was
sporadic rather than pervasive. Just as the Claiborne Court refused to
hold peaceful boycotters responsible for the actions of "Black Hat"
enforcers, 09 the peaceful WTO protesters should not have been forced to
sacrifice their rights to the "Black Block" of violent anarchists.210 Under
Claiborne, peaceful protesters may not be held guilty by association of
the acts of vandals and vigilantes.2 '
C. Order 3 Operated as a Prior Restraint and Fails the Strict Scrutiny
Test
When an emergency order acts as a prior restraint, a reviewing court
must employ the strict scrutiny standard of New York Times Co. v.
205. Id.
206. See, e.g., Postman & Carter, supra note 6.
207. Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 933.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 925-26.
210. See Postman, supra note 6.
211. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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United States.212 Order 3 does not meet the "heavy burden '213 of New
York Times because it restricted expressive activity on days when the
City could not show the existence of a significant threat to public
order.214 The government's interest in restoring public order on
November 30 was significant, and implicated the First Amendment rights
of WTO delegates and others attempting to travel downtown.21' The
scales tip heavily against Order 3, however, in subsequent days. The
rights of delegates to travel and to assemble were not threatened during
December 1-3.2I6 Ample evidence suggests that most protesters would
not return on subsequent days. For example, the labor march, which
brought thousands downtown, was a one-day event.217
While the City of Seattle relied on Madsen v. Women's Health
Center211 in defending Order 3, Madsen actually shows that Order 3
operated as a prior restraint.219 In Madsen, the Court found that an
injunction did not operate as a prior restraint because it left open myriad
alternative means for communicating the respondent's anti-abortion
message.Y0 Order 3, however, was not an "incidental" burden on WTO
protesters. The protesters' anti-WTO message was completely restricted
from a fifty-block area of downtown Seattle,221 thereby precluding their
presence in any area where they could potentially interact with WTO
delegates. Just as Madsen struck down a 300-foot "no-approach zone" as
restricting too much speech,' so the District Court should have forced
Mayor Schell to restrict only as much speech as necessary.
Additionally, Order 3's duration points toward treating it as a prior
restraint. Unlike the anti-abortion protests in Madsen, the WTO-protests
were inevitably transitory in nature, since the ministerial meeting lasted
only until December 3.m The restriction of all protest activity in the
212. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
213. Id. at 714 (internal quotation marks omitted).
214. See Chasan, supra note 41.
215. Cf supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
216. See Barber, supra note 17.
217. See, e.g., Sunde, supra note 18.
218. 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
219. See supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
220. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 764.
221. Postman & Carter, supra note 6.
222. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 766.
223. See Police Summary of Events, supra note 1.
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downtown core for the duration of the conference did not leave open
alternative methods for protest, like protests that occurred after violence
had subsided. Peaceful protests should have been allowed on December
1-4, because any restriction that foreclosed protest activity for the entire
week could not have been narrowly tailored.
D. Order 3 Fails the Test for Content-Neutral Restrictions on First
Amendment Activities
Even where emergency orders are not treated as prior restraints, courts
must apply the rules for content-neutral restrictions on speech. While
courts should consider the facts of each case when evaluating emergency
orders, Order 3 provides a useful template for applying the content-
neutral rules. Although Order 3 is facially content neutral,2 4 it fails the
O'Brien test for restrictions that are generally applicable to speech and
conduct. While Order 3 did not ban protest in the entire City of Seattle, it
fails the Ward test for time, place, or manner restrictions on expressive
activity in the public fora. Finally, Order 3 is unconstitutional under the
U.S. Supreme Court cases that focus specifically on protecting entry and
exit at specific locations.
1. Order 3 Fails the O'Brien Test
United States v. O'Brien.5 sets forth a broad test for evaluating
conduct-based restrictions on First Amendment rights.226 Order 3 passes
the first two prongs of the O'Brien test-constitutional authority and
significant government interest."' Order 3 is unconstitutional because it
fails the fourth prong, which requires that restrictions be narrowly
tailored. 28 In O'Brien, the Court found that a prohibition on destroying
224. Order 3, supra note 9. See generally Madsen, 512 U.S. at 763 (holding that injunction was
content neutral even though it tended to affect those with only one viewpoint).
225. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
226. Id. at 377.
227. See supra Part Il.D. 1-2. It is within the power of the Seattle City Mayor to declare a state of
emergency. SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 10.02.010 (1999); see also WASH. REV. CODE
§ 38.52.020 (2000). Order 3 makes reference to the imminent necessity of "extraordinary measures
to protect the public peace, safety and welfare" as required by the Seattle Municipal Code and state
law of Washington. See Order 3, supra note 9.
228. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. Whether Order 3 passes the third prong-the requirement that its
purpose be unrelated to suppressing free expression-is disputed by several legal organizations. The
ACLU, National Lawyers' Guild, Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, and Direct Action Network assert
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draft cards restricted only as much expressive activity as was necessary
to further the government's interest in a smooth-running conscription
system.229 Here, however, the government's interest was served when the
association and assembly rights of WTO delegates were no longer
threatened, and when public order had been restored to downtown
Seattle. Those criteria were met on or before Tuesday morning,
December 1.230 By enforcing the no-protest zone for the next three days,
Order 3 restricted more speech than necessary and was unconstitutional.
2. Order 3 Is Not a Valid Time, Place, or Manner Restriction
In the narrower context of public-fora speech regulations, Ward v.
Rock Against Racism requires that time, place, or manner restrictions be
"narrowly tailored" and leave open "ample alternative channels" for
communication."1 Under Bay Area Peace Navy v. United States, 2
32
governments in the Ninth Circuit bear the burden of proof on both issues.
Order 3 also fails the narrow-tailoring test. In Bay Area Peace Navy,
the Ninth Circuit held a seventy-five-yard safety zone unconstitutional
because military officials could not show that the zone was necessary to
protect military officials.1 3 With regard to Order 3, the City bears the
burden of producing "tangible evidence" to show that its restrictions on
expressive activity were not "substantially broader than necessary.
The City cannot show that prohibiting all protest activity in the
downtown core on December 1, December 2, and December 3 was
necessary to preserve the safety of WTO delegates or to prevent further
public disorder; therefore, Order 3 is unconstitutional.
Even aside from the narrow-tailoring test, Order 3 is unconstitutional
because it fails to provide ample alternative channels for the protestors to
that police enforcement of Order 3 singled out even the most subtle anti-WTO expression. See, e.g.,
Chasan, supra note 41; Paul Richmond, Waging War on Dissent, a Report by the Seattle National
Lawyers Guild WTO Legal Group, at http.//seattle.indymedia.org/local/images/NLG-REPORT.pdf
(last visited Apr. 17, 2001). The Seattle City Council's Review Panel agreed. Operations Panel
Report, supra note 10, at 31-32. As applied, Order 3 was viewpoint-specific, and thus violated the
First Amendment.
229. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 381-82.
230. See Chasan, supra note 41.
231. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,791 (1989).
232. 914 F.2d 1224, 1229 (9th Cir. 1990).
233. Id. at 1227.
234. Id.
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communicate their message.235 In Bay Area Peace Navy, a regulation
prohibiting the "Peace Navy" flotilla from coming within seventy-five
yards of the official viewing area was held unconstitutional because the
protesters' audience would be unable to hear their singing at that
distance.236 The situation in Seattle is analogous. When WTO protesters
were banned from downtown, they were unable to effectively deliver
their message.237 The protesters needed access to the downtown core to
be effective; indeed, many groups applied for parade and event permits
to protect their rights to demonstrate downtown.238 Because Order 3
leaves no adequate alternative method for protesters to deliver their
message, it fails the Bay Area Peace Navy test.
Order 3 is unconstitutional notwithstanding the holding in Ward.
According to Ward, regulations need not be the "least restrictive"
possible to serve the government's interest; the government must show
only that its stated interest would be served less effectively absent a
given regulation.239 The facts in Ward, however, remain distinct, and the
ruling of the Ward Court is not applicable in the context of mass
demonstrations. Ward addressed an ordinance requiring concert organ-
izers to use city-owned sound equipment and a city sound technician
during outdoor concerts.24 While volume was controlled, the music itself
was never restricted or banned.24 Order 3, in contrast, totally banned
protest activity within the no-protest zone.242
3. Order 3 Is Unconstitutional Under the U.S. Supreme Court's
Entry-Exit Cases
Finally, Order 3 is unconstitutional under the Court's abortion-clinic
cases--directly analogous holdings governing entry into and exit from
specific locations. These cases establish that protecting entry and exit can
constitute a significant government interest, such that an incidental
235. Id. at 1229.
236. Id. at 1226, 1229.
237. Operations Panel Report, supra note 10, at 4-5.
238. Kimerer Declaration, supra note 24 (including parade permits).
239. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989).
240. Id. at 784.
241. See id.
242. Order 3, supra note 9.
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impact on First Amendment rights is acceptable.243 The Court, however,
has consistently scrutinized geographic restrictions to ensure that "no
more speech than necessary" is restricted.2' A thirty-six-foot exclusion-
ary zone around a building was held constitutional, as was an eight-foot
zone around patients and clinic staff, as long as protesters were not
forced to move out of the way when approached by a protected person. 245
On the other hand, a fifteen-foot floating buffer zone was held
unconstitutional, as were all zones more than thirty-six feet-including a
300-foot "no-approach zone" and a 300-foot zone around private
residences that included a prohibition against blocking street access.2 6
Order 3 exceeds all of the acceptable rules for regulating access to a
specific location. Under these rules, the Seattle Police could have
provided cordoned-off passageways for WTO delegates to make their
way into the convention center. Following Hill v. Colorado,247 the police
may also have forbidden that individuals approach within eight feet of
another person "for the purpose of... engaging in oral protest.., with
[that] person." 48 Closing the entire downtown core to protesters for three
days, however, restricted significantly more speech than necessary. Even
if the City could show that such action was the only way to ensure
access, there is no precedent for the closure of such a large area. Far from
providing support for Order 3's constitutionality,249 Madsen, Schenk v.
Pro-Choice Network,S° and Hill show that Order 3 cannot survive First
Amendment scrutiny.
In evaluating emergency powers as content-neutral restrictions on
First Amendment rights, courts must apply O'Brien, Ward, Bay Area
Peace Navy, and the abortion clinic entry-exit cases. If courts find that an
emergency order is not narrowly tailored, or that it restricts more speech
than necessary, the emergency order should be found unconstitutional.
Order 3 is an example of an emergency order that fails both the rules in
243. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480,2494 (2000) (noting that Colorado statute stated
significant government interest).
244. See, e.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994).
245. Id. at 759; Hill, 120 S. Ct at 2484, 2499.
246. See supra notes 134-40 and accompanying text.
247. 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000).
248. Hill, 120 S. Ct. at 2484 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122 (3) (1999)).
249. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
250. 519 U.S. 357 (1997).
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O'Brien and Ward and the specific guidelines set out in the entry-exit
cases.
E. Order 3 Is Unconstitutional as an Emergency Order
Order 3 represents the coalescence of two trends in emergency
powers." 1 On the one hand, the use of executive action to restrict the
large-scale exercise of First Amendment rights shows that the normal-
emergency dichotomy has blurred. Without foreign aggression, a
tsunami, or even a race riot, downtown Seattle was buttoned up and
cordoned off. The "emergency" in Seattle was not an invasion or a
natural disaster, but the coming together of large numbers of people to
exercise First Amendment rights. On the other hand, the pressure on
local officials to facilitate the ministerial meeting by curtailing peaceful
protests shows that economic concems are first-order priorities for
modem governments. The preeminence of the WTO in the world
economy positions Order 3 as a logical next step in exploiting the notion
of "emergency" for the sake of political expediency. Indeed, mass
demonstrations may create emergency situations for local governments.
In responding to emergencies created by the large-scale exercise of First
Amendment rights, however, local governments in the Ninth Circuit
must follow Collins v. Jordan.52
Under Collins, daytime curfews are presumptively unconstitutional. 3
As the Collins court held, a nighttime curfew and a daytime no-protest
zone are "entirely different matter[s]. '254 In noting that violence had
occurred during evening protests, the Collins court refused to allow the
extension of a protest ban to the daytime hours of the following day.255
Unless the City can show that such a ban was the only way to maintain
public order and protect the rights of WTO delegates, Order 3 is
unconstitutional under Collins.
Additionally, the Collins holding explicitly connects the duration of
emergency orders with the requirement that First Amendment restrictions
be narrowly tailored. 6 An emergency on one day does not provide a
251. See supra Part III.A.
252. 110 F.3d 1363 (9th Cir. 1996).
253. See id. at 1371.
254. Id. at 1374.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 1372.
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basis per se for banning protests on subsequent days; such a ban "is pre-
sumptively a First Amendment violation."2 7 The City cannot show that
an "emergency" existed in downtown Seattle during any daytime hours
on December 1-3.258 Collins explicitly forbids the prophylactic use of
no-protest zones, and under that decision Order 3 is unconstitutional.
The rule in United States v. Chalk259 suggests the opposite result.
Chalk indicates that emergency orders will not be scrutinized where local
officials act in good faith and have some factual basis for their actions.26°
Chalk should not be applied here because that case and its progeny
address riots and natural disasters, not mostly peaceful political
protests.26' Also, the Chalk line of cases does not address daytime no-
protest zones or other daytime bans on expressive activity.262 Collins,
aside from being the controlling authority in the Ninth Circuit, provides a
better rule because it specifically addresses daytime curfews and political
protest.
In refusing to grant the ACLU's motion for a TRO against the
enforcement of Order 3, Judge Bryan effectively gave the City of Seattle
the right to institute its own injunction against nonviolent protesters.
Judge Bryan's hesitancy to second-guess the government's interest in
establishing order during the ministerial meeting is understandable.
However, by denying the ACLU's motion, the court violated the holding
of Collins and sanctioned the comprehensive denial of protesters' First
Amendment rights.
V. CONCLUSION
Mass protests have reemerged in the era of globalization, highlighting
a dialectic of integration and alienation among environmentalists, human
rights advocates, and labor interests. The media attention and public
awareness attendant to these protests is a strong incentive toward their
use in furthering political goals. Without First Amendment protection,
these dissenting voices will be quieted. In a media environment
257. Id. at 1371.
258. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
259. 441 F.2d 1277 (1971).




dominated by sound bites and scandals, activists without the tool of mass
protest may go unnoticed and unrecognized.
Emergency Order 3, issued by Mayor Schell in the morning of
December 1, 1999, violated the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. Instead of promulgating narrowly tailored emergency
orders to protect WTO delegates and to prevent violence, Mayor Schell
forced an end to peaceful protest demonstrations. Order 3 made peaceful
protesters guilty by association, punishing them for the sporadic violence
of the Black Block and other fringe groups. In addition, Order 3
restricted too much speech-it closed the public forum of downtown
Seattle for three days, longer than was necessary to restore order and
protect the WTO delegates.
The Seattle WTO protests indicate that a more developed and
aggressive jurisprudence addressing these issues is necessary and timely.
At the very least, courts should protect the rights of peaceful protesters
by striking down government action that goes too far in trampling First
Amendment rights. Litigation regarding Order 3 should reflect the need
for consistent, meaningful protection of the freedom of speech. There
must be a constitutional lesson learned from the "Battle in Seattle":
When authorities respond to mass protests, they must be diligent,
deliberate, and careful not to restrict too much speech. What was not
demonstrated in Seattle-but what this Comment attempts to show-is
that police must coexist with protestors, public order must tolerate
dissent, and emergency does not justify censorship.
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